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1 
Summary 
The purpose of this thesis is to try to establish a mechanism that will enable the Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to get access to legal interpretation of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The mandate of the Commission is to validate the 
outer limits line delineated by coastal States. For that, the Commission has to apply 
provisions of the Convention. The use of legal provisions necessitates interpretation. It is 
submitted that the Commission has to interpret some provisions of the Convention in order to 
perform its mandate. Yet, its interpretative attribute is limited to the assessment of its 
technical functions. When it cannot interpret, the Commission cannot fulfil its mandate and 
the outer edge of the continental margin cannot be established. To avoid maritime boundaries 
staying in an impasse, the Commission has to ask competent bodies to seek an advisory 
opinion from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The author reviews the 
possible mechanisms opened to the International Seabed Authority and international 
agreements, and promote a liberal interpretation of these provisions to open the scope of their 
availability.  The possibility to open the advisory procedure to the Meeting of States Parties 
and States, acting under the umbrella of an international agreement or acting as individual 
States, is discussed and encouraged. In fact, States are the cornerstone between the advisory 
opinion and the Commission. Their will and sovereign power in terms of implementation of 
the Convention are the means through which the CLCS can be granted access to legal 
interpretation.  
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Abbreviations 
Article 76 Article 76 of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea 
Chamber, the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
CLCS or the Commission  Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf 
ISA, or the Authority International Seabed Authority 
ITLOS, or the Tribunal International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
Meeting, the  The Meeting of States Parties 
UNCLOS, or the Convention United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea 
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1 Introduction  
In the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf the extent of the shelf was not 
defined.
1
 Pursuant to Article 1, “a coastal States had jurisdiction over the adjacent continental 
shelf as far seaward as the resources of the adjacent shelf were exploitable.”2 Article 76 of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) gives a definable limit to the 
shelf and “to the claim that a state can make to the continental margin however difficult the 
defining of that limit may be.”3 
Besides ascertaining the possible limits of the continental shelf,
4
 article 76 creates a 
Commission, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (or CLCS), which is in 
charge of making recommendations on data and information submitted by the coastal State.
5
 
The purpose of the creation of such an organ was to ensure that the delineation of the 
continental shelf would be done by coastal States with due respect to the provisions of article 
76, its formulae and constraint lines.  
In fact, coastal States that want to establish the limits of their continental shelf beyond 200 
nautical miles, from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, in 
accordance with the provisions of article 76, should submit information to the CLCS. 
Information submitted are scientific data that must reflect the geological and 
                                                 
1
 Convention on the Continental Shelf, of 29 April 1958 (entered into force on 10 June 1964; United Nations 
Treaty Series, Vol. 499, p.311). 
2
 Ted L. McDorman, ”The Role of the Commission on the Limits f the Continental Shelf: A Technical Body in a 
Political World”, International Journal for Marine and Coastal Law, Vol 17, No 3 (2002) p. 307. 
3
 Definable limit is a term employed by Ted L. macDorman. In itallics in the text. See reference supra. 
4
 The term continental shelf is used in the introduction as referring to the legal continental shelf. The legal 
notion of the continental shelf does not only refer to the shelf as a part of the continental margin; this notion 
refers to the shelf as it can be delineated  in accordance with the formulae and constraint lines of article 76. 
5
 Article 3, Annex II to UNCLOS, see Supplement A including Article 76 of UNCLOS and Article 3, Annex II 
to UNCLOS; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 10 December 1982 (entered into 
force on 16 November 1994; United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1833, p.396). The other function of the CLCS 
is to provide scientific and technical advice; this function will not be looked at in this thesis. 
 
5 
geomorphological conditions set up in article 76.
6
 Collecting relevant data in order to 
establish the outer limits line of the shelf is a difficult task; as well as delineating the outer 
limits line according to the provisions of article 76. Coastal States may, intentionally or not, 
establish the line not in accordance with article 76.  
To avoid the outer limits line being established beyond the scope of the provisions of article 
76 and to avoid the Area to be encroached by national jurisdiction, the Commission has been 
assigned with the mandate to control that the outer limits line are justified,
7
 thus that the line 
is delineated in accordance with the provisions of article 76. The Commission is a watchdog, 
which has the responsibility to control that the outer limits line submitted by the coastal State 
does not constitute an exaggerated claim.
8
 
If the outer limits line is recognised to be in conformity with the provisions of article 76, the 
continental shelf can be delimitated by the coastal State in a legitimate manner. The CLCS 
has thus a role of legitimator in regards to the delineation of the outer continental margin.
9
 
The role of the Commission is to verify that the outer limits line proposed by the coastal State 
is in conformity with article 76. When the Commission verify the information submitted it 
must check that the outer limits line is delineated in accordance with article 76. The CLCS 
should thus make use of legal provisions. The use of legal provisions might imply their 
interpretation and it is the purpose of this thesis to know whether the Commission has the 
capacity to interpret legal provisions. 
                                                 
6
 United Nations, Office of Legal Affairs, DOALOS (ed.), ”Defintion of Continental shelf”, p.22-23. 
7
 Ted L. MacDorman, see footnote 2, p.308. The outer edge of the continental margin depends on the choice 
made by the submitting State to the CLCS. Article 76 provides with formulae and constraint lines that gives 
choice as to where the outer limits may be situated. One formulae or one constraint line may be chosen over 
others.  
8
 Ibid. Ted L. MacDorman refers to 1994 US Commentary, US Senate Treaty Doc. 103-109, 103rd Congress, 
2nd Session, 1994: ”The Commission is designed to provide a mechanism to prevent or reduce the potential for 
dispute and uncertainty over the precise limits of the continental shelf... Ultimate responsibility for the 
delimitation lies with the coastal State itself, subject to safeguards against exaggerated claims”. 
9
 Itallics used by the author , ibid. p.319. 
 
6 
In order to apprehend the mandate of the Commission and its scope, legal instruments, 
documents and reports are used. This dogmatic method does not bring into the equation any 
elaborated case law analysis.  
The question whether the Commission has the ability to interpret legal provisions is analysed. 
In fact, the Commission has not been directly entrusted with the competence to interpret the 
Convention. Yet, because law and science are intertwined, the CLCS has to take on a 
capacity to interpret in order to fulfil its mandate.
10
 The interpretative prerogative of the 
Commission is limited and the restricted scope of its capacities put the CLCS in an impasse. 
Consequently, the Commission needs to find other ways to access legal interpretation and 
carry out its technical functions. The question whether there are any mechanisms available 
under the Convention and its related instruments that may create a bridge between the CLCS 
and the ITLOS are examined. In fact, the Commission is not yet entitled to seek an advisory 
opinion. Other bodies must seek an advisory opinion for the CLCS. 
 
                                                 
10
 First Report of the Committee, Legal Issues of the Outer Continental Shelf, in International Law Association, 
Report of the Seventy-Second Conference (ILA, Berlin: 2004) (hereafter Berlin Conference), p.3. The First and 
Second Report are available at www.ila-hq.org/html/layout_committee.htm, accessed May 23rd, 2013. 
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2 Capacity for interpretation of the 
CLCS 
The Commission, in order to assess the scientific and technical data, should make use of the 
terms and concepts of the Convention. Using terms and concepts that are not defined can be 
tricky for a technical body that is not composed of jurists. The members of the Commission 
have to assess scientific and technical terms and concepts outside the scope of geology, 
geophysics and take into account the legal meaning that has been embedded in them. Thus, 
the Commission cannot refer to scientific methodology solely to assess the submitted data. 
The Commission has to take into account that the terms and scientific concepts have lost their 
pure scientific meaning and that they have to be processed in a legal context. The scientific 
terms and concepts (or formulae) have to be understood under the umbrella of the legal 
instrument, the Convention. Thus, the Commission has to clarify the meaning of such terms 
and concepts and consequently interpret the provisions of article 76.  
2.1 Nature of the capacity of interpretation of the 
CLCS 
To interpret provisions of the Convention the Commission should have the competence to do 
so. It will be analysed whether the Commission has the mandate to interpret provisions of 
UNCLOS.  
2.1.1 Presumption of competence of the CLCS 
The Commission is an organ created under article 76 paragraph 8 of UNCLOS and is 
presumably independent. However, this organ may be seen as a subsidiary body of the United 
Nations. This would imply that the Commission would be attached to a higher authority and 
would not be allowed much room for manoeuvre in terms of competence and interpretation of 
legal provisions. 
 
8 
2.1.1.1 Autonomous status 
In 1997, the CLCS requested the Legal Counsel of the United Nations to provide the 
Commission with a formal legal opinion as to the applicability of the Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations to the members of the Commission.
11
 The 
Legal Counsel answered through a legal opinion.
12
  
The point here is not to analyse whether the members of the Commission can benefit from the 
privileges and immunities granted to employees of the United Nations; it is rather to analyse 
the explanation given by the Legal Counsel regarding the status of the Commission. 
In fact, in order to be granted privileges and immunities, the members of the Commission 
have to be considered as working for the United Nations. For that purpose, the status of the 
Commission is examined and the Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations for Legal 
Affairs answered that: 
[t]he Commission is neither a principal nor a subsidiary organ of the United Nation, but might 
be considered as a “treaty organ” of the Organization. Indeed, there is a group of organs 
which, though their establishment is provided for in a treaty, are so closely linked with the 
United Nations that they are considered organs of the Organization.
13
 
Thus, the Commission, a “treaty organ” of the Organisation, is not a subsidiary organ of the 
United Nations. The Commission is linked to the Organisation but is independent in its work. 
Besides, Elie Jarmache noted that: 
[l]’alternative entre autonomie et subordination n’est pas tranchée pour autant. Il reste une 
relation qui est fonctionnelle avec le Secrétaire général permettant d’ancrer la CLPC dans le 
moule des Nations Unies.
14
 
                                                 
11
 It can be noted that this request for a legal opinion to the Legal Counsel was the first to have been asked by 
the Commission after its creation. The question whether the Commission has the competence to ask legal 
opinions to the Legal Counsel of the United Nations may be raised.  
12
 Letter dated 11 March 1998 from the Legal Counsel, Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations for 
Legal Affairs, addressed to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, CLCS 3
rd
 Session, 4-15 May 
1998, CLCS/5, Legal Opinion on the applicability of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
United Nations to the members of the Commission (hereafter CLCS/5). 
13
 Ibid., CLCS/5, p.1. 
14
 Elie Jarmache, ’A propos de la Commission des Limites du Plateau Continental’, (2006) XI Annuaire du droit 
de la mer, p.57. Translation: The choice between autonomy and subordination is not settled, for all that. A 
relationship remains which is functional with the Secretary-General and permits to anchor the CLCS in the 
mould of the United Nations. This translation and the following ones are made by the author of this thesis. 
 
9 
Consequently, the Commission is linked to an organ, the United Nations. The functional 
relationship allows the CLCS to benefit from the Secretariat-General. The secretariat of the 
Commission is provided by the Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea 
(DOALOS), a division of the Office of Legal Affairs;
15
 and a resolution of the General 
Assembly requested the Secretary-General to provide “from within existing resources, such 
services as may be required ... for the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.”16   
Consequently, the Commission is, on the one hand, not subordinated to another organ but is, 
on the other hand, not entirely independent in its functioning, and the members of the 
Commission are considered to be “experts on mission” on behalf of the United Nations.17 The 
CLCS seems to possess an unusual status;
18
 as being independent in its assessment of the data 
and information submitted to it, yet being linked to DOALOS regarding its functioning, the 
CLCS may be considered as a sui generis organ.  
The mandate of the Commission may go further than what has been expressly assigned to it 
in the Convention and its Annex II. Its independence and its role of application of legal 
provisions of the Convention may bring it to extend the scope of its mandate, and take 
kompetenz kompetenz
19
 to deal with interpretation of legal provisions.
20
 
                                                 
15
 See footnote 12, p.2. 
16
 Ibid., p.2 referring to General Assembly resolution 49/28, of 6 December 1994, para. 10. 
17
 Ibid., p.3. 
18
 See footnote 14, p.55. 
19
 See Bjørn Kunoy, ’Legal Problems Relating to Differences Arising between Recommendations of the CLCS 
and the Submission of a Particular State’, in Clive R. Symmonds (ed.), Selected Contemporary Issues in the Law 
of the Sea (2011), p.326 referring to the Nottebohm case, Preliminary Objection, Judgement, [1953] ICJ Rep., 
p.119, in which the Court affirmed the kompetenz-kompetenz principle as a principle of international law: ”Since 
the Alabama case, it has been generally recognized, following the earlier precedents, that, in the absence of any 
agreement to the contrary, an international tribunal has the right to decide as to its own jurisdiction and has the 
power to interpret for this purpose the instruments which govern that jurisdiction.”   
20
 See footnote 14, p.55: ”La CLPC dispose d’une compétence normative directe et effective qui va contribuer a 
son originalité.”  
 
10 
2.1.1.2 Normative input 
Coastal States in order to fulfil their duty, that is to say, submit the outer limits of their 
extended continental shelf to the CLCS, must refer to the provisions of article 76. These 
provisions define the concepts of the continental shelf and continental margin and explain the 
different formulae to delineate the outer limits of the shelf. In order to make their 
submissions, coastal States use the provisions of article 76 and try to construe their 
significance. 65 submissions have been made to the Commission. Each coastal State and each 
submission may contain different interpretations of the terms and formulae of article 76. 
Consequently, the CLCS will have to deal with several interpretations of article 76 and its 
related provisions. 
The combination of formulae used and delineation lines submitted by coastal States differ 
from State to State and from submission to submission because the terms and concepts are 
not defined identically.
21
 In addition, the members of the CLCS might have different opinions 
on the application of article 76 and use different scientific methodologies.  
The plethora of submissions and interpretations points to the need for harmonisation of the 
work of the Commission. Consequently, the Commission will have to give guidance on the 
application of the provisions of article 76 to harmonise its practice and the ones of the 
submitting States. 
The Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the Commission were created to ensure uniform 
practice among submitting States.
22
 The Guidelines frame the admissibility of scientific data 
and clarify the interpretation of provisions contained in UNCLOS.
23
 Together with the Rules 
of procedure, that frames the practice of the Commission, the CLCS created a corpus of 
instruments that concur to uniformity of its practice and of the ones of the submitting States.   
                                                 
21
 These uncertainties will allow coastal States to take advantage on this lack of clarity to delineate the limits 
with the elasticity offered by the provisions of article 76. 
22
 United Nations, Office of Legal Affairs, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (ed.), ”Training 
manual for delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles and for preparation 
of submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf” (hereafter Training manual), I-52. 
23
 Ibid. 
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Beyond creating uniformity, these instruments conceal a legal essence. In fact, the 
Commission has the power to create rules.
24
 These rules cover the procedural aspects of the 
work of the Commission.
25
 These sets of rules have an impact on coastal States. They create 
standards that coastal States must observe when submitting. In fact, it should be the 
responsibility of coastal States to choose the data they want to submit. Coastal States may 
oppose to these rules and bring their own information. And yet, if States want their 
submission to be accepted, they have an interest in submitting information that can be 
validated by the Commission. Consequently, the coastal States are bound by the rules created 
by the CLCS
26
 and the fact that the data submitted comply in practice with the rules 
established by the CLCS shows that all the elements of a normative power are in place.
27
 
Creating a corpus of instruments to ensure uniformity in the work of the Commission and the 
submission of coastal States, seem to be a prerogative of the Commission.
28
 If the CLCS has 
the power to create legal instruments, it might be that the Commission has consequently the 
power to interpret them and their legal framework. In the Training manual it is said that the 
Guidelines “serve to clarify the interpretation of scientific, technical and legal terms 
contained in UNCLOS (emphasis added).”29 Thus, it seems that the Commission “has to be 
                                                 
24
 See footnote 14, p.58-60, Elie Jarmache uses the term ’normative input’ (apport normatif). 
25
 See footnote 22. 
26
 ”Le règlement intérieur participe de la même logique normative: la CLPC doit disposer de l’outil de base qui 
décrit, autant pour elle-même que pour ses clients que sont les Etats côtiers demandeurs, la procédure à suivre, 
les différentes étapes qui vont du dépôt d’un dossier au rendu des recommendations. La richesse de ce document 
exprime bien son objet d’être un indicateur des comportements des différents acteurs de la chaîne de 
l’extension”, Elie Jarmache, see footnote 14, p.59. Translation: The rules share the same normative logic: the 
CLCS must have the basic tool that describes, both for itself and its customers that are the submitting coastal 
States, the procedure, the different stages ranging from filing of a case to the making of recommendations. The 
richness of this document expresses the object to be an indicator of the behavior of various actors in the 
extension chain. 
27
 ”Derrière ces circonvolutions et ces prudences de langage, tous les élèments d’un «pouvoir normatif» sont en 
place.” Elie Jarmache, ibid., p.58. 
28
 Berlin Conference, see footnote 10, p.5. 
29
 See Training manual, footnote 22. 
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presumed to be competent to deal with issues concerning the interpretation or application of 
article 76 or other relevant articles of the Convention.”30  
Yet, interpretation of legal provisions may be hardly conceived as a prerogative of a technical 
body.
31
 However, the competence of the Commission to interpret provisions of UNCLOS is 
relevant to the extent required to carry out the functions that are explicitly assigned to it.
32
 
2.1.2 Interpretative attribute of the CLCS
33
 
The mandate of the CLCS is linked to the interpretation of the legal provisions. Assessment 
of its technical functions relies on the clarity of the legal terms used in article 76 and related 
provisions. The Commission navigates in legal uncertainties and its mandate suffers from this 
situation. The Commission is subjected to a deadlock whenever legal interpretation arises in 
the course of its assessment of technical information. Thus, the Commission has no other 
choice than to deal with these legal provisions and has to take legal functions to pursue its 
mandate. The interpretation of legal provisions is incumbent upon a competent body. The 
question raised is whether the Commission, a technical body, has competence to undertake 
legal work, that is to say, interpret legal provisions. 
2.1.2.1 Interpretative requisite 
Data submitted by the coastal State should prove that the limits delineated are so in 
accordance with the provisions of article 76.
34
 Thus, the work of the Commission is confined 
                                                 
30
 See footnote 28. 
31
 Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Twenty-eighth session (1 August-9 September 2011), 
Progress of work in the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Statement by the Chairperson (16 
September 2011), CLCS/72 (hereafter CLCS/72), Item 14, p.10. 
32
 See footnote 28. 
33
 “Interpretative attribute” is a term used by the author to refer to the capacities that has the CLCS to interpret 
certain provisions in order to carry out its technical functions. 
34
 See footnote 5 and Supplement A. 
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within the framework of legal provisions in which the CLCS ensure that the delineation line 
submitted by the coastal State is in accordance with the provisions of article 76:
35
  
 [a]lthough the functions of the CLCS are concerned with the assessment of scientific and 
technical data, this assessment has to be carried out ‘in accordance with article 76 of the 
Convention’. This wording indicates that the CLCS is bound to apply the substantive 
provisions of article 76 in considering the information that has been submitted by the coastal 
State. This requirement would raise few problems if the provisions of article 76 would not 
raise any questions concerning their interpretation or application. However, this clearly is not 
the case. The interpretation and practical application of various provisions of article 76 are 
controversial. While one interpretation of a provision of article 76 may lead to the conclusion 
that specific data proves that the requirements of the article are met, under another 
interpretation the same data might not provide sufficient proof in this respect.
36
 
The provisions of article 76 lack clarity. In fact, they contain scientific terms but these terms 
instead of taking on a purely scientific meaning, actually assume a legal significance.
37
 The 
use of article 76 raises for the Commission problems of application and interpretation. In the 
process of ensuring that the technical provisions of article 76 are met, the Commission will 
have to refer to terms and concepts that are scientific in nature but used in a legal context,
38
 
which means that the sense of these terms and concepts may be blurred by the context in 
which they are used.  
The lack of clarity is due to the fact that at the third United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea, the scientific terms used in legal provisions have not been defined: 
                                                 
35
 The Commission should ensure that the technical and scientific requirements of the provisions are met, that is 
to say, that the calculation and proof of location of lines are met, or in other words, that the lines are delineated 
in accordance with the definition of the foot of the slope, sea floor highs etc.  
36
 Berlin Conference, see footnote 10, p.3. For an analysis of the Berlin and Toronto Conferences in relation to 
the legal expertise of the Commission and its competence to interpret the Convention see Betsy Baker, ’States 
Parties and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf’ in Ndiaye and Wolfrum (eds.), Law of the 
Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes (2007) p.680-686. 
37
 It is not the purpose of this thesis to analyse the challenges of the application of article 76 in relation to the 
delineation of the outer edge of the continental margin. See author’s paper: “The Bengal rule”. 
38
 Berlin Conference, see footnote 10, p.6; ”Article 76 ’makes use of scientific terms in a legal context which at 
times departs [sic] significantly from accepted scientific definitions and terminology’”, in Bjørn Kunoy, see 
footnote 19, referring to the ”Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf”, UN Docs, CLCS/11 (13 May 1999) (hereafter the Guidelines or CLCS/11), point 1.3. The 
notion of the continental shelf in the provisions of UNCLOS does not refer to the scientific shelf. The legal 
notion of the continental shelf refers to the 200 nautical mile (M)-zone from the baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea is measured, see footnote 6, p.22 et s. 
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La CLPC souligne que ce travail à portée normative a pu être justifié aussi en raison du 
silence de la 3ème Conférence sur le droit de la mer au cours de laquelle il a pu ne pas être 
“jugé nécessaire de définir le sens exact des termes scientifiques et techniques utilisés”.39 
The technical functions of the Commission, which are to consider data and make 
recommendations,
40
 presume that the CLCS will have to make use of scientific concepts. 
Since these concepts are controversial, the Commission will have to provide itself with 
interpretations of terms used in article 76.
41
 In terms of interpretation, the CLCS states, in its 
training manual, that the purposes of its Guidelines serve to “clarify the interpretation of 
scientific, technical and legal terms contained in UNCLOS”.42 Thus, the Commission vests 
itself with the capacity to interpret legal provisions.  
Legal and scientific concepts are intertwined in the context of article 76 and its related 
provisions.
43
 Therefore, even if the CLCS should be charged with the interpretation of 
scientific terms and concepts only, it could not do so. Scientific terms, under the Convention, 
have lost their scientific sense and are clothed with a legal sense, to give birth to original 
concepts mixing law and science. Therefore, the CLCS has no other choice but to interpret 
the scientific and the legal terms. 
The Commission should not interpret legal provisions but should rather interpret legal 
provisions in order to fulfil its functions: 
The CLCS is an organ that has been assigned specific functions under the Convention.
 
In 
order to make recommendations to coastal States, it has to make an independent evaluation of 
the submissions of coastal States in respect of the outer limits of the continental shelf.
 
The 
CLCS has to be presumed to have the competence that is required to carry out these tasks.
 
The 
[…] Convention attributes certain functions explicitly to the CLCS, namely the consideration 
of scientific and technical data submitted by the coastal State and the provision of scientific 
and technical advice to coastal States in the preparation of submissions. On the other hand, the 
                                                 
39
 Elie Jarmache, see footnote 14, p.58. Translation: The CLCS emphasizes that this work, with a normative 
scope, could also be justified because of the silence of the 3rd Conference on the Law of the Sea during which it 
could not be "considered necessary to define the exact meaning of the scientific and technical words used."  
40
 See footnote 5 and Supplement A. 
41
 See Rules of procedure of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Doc. CLCS/40/Rev.1 of 17 
April 2008, (CLCS/40) (hereafter the Rules of procedure or CLCS/40), and the Guidelines, footnote 38. 
42
 Training manual, see footnote 22, I-52. 
43
 ”Given that Article 76 of the Convention includes scientific concepts which are subject to autonomous legal 
definitions, it is obvious that the scope of these provisions can only be determined according to legal 
hermeneutics” in Bjørn Kunoy, see footnote 19, p.311. 
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Convention does not charge the Commission to consider and make recommendations on legal 
matters. However, the Commission has to be presumed to be competent to deal with issues 
concerning the interpretation or application of article 76 or other relevant articles of the 
Convention to the extent this is required to carry out the functions which are explicitly 
assigned to it.
44
 
The Commission takes this prerogative in order to execute its mandate. Therefore, the 
competence of the Commission is subordinated to the fulfilment of its technical functions. 
The CLCS cannot consider data and make recommendations without interpreting the legal 
framework in which its technical mandate lies. Interpretation is an attribute of its technical 
functions. In other words, interpretation is a quality belonging to the exercise of its technical 
functions.  
2.1.2.2 Delimited attribution 
The Commission has the duty to consider the data submitted and make recommendations on 
the submission. Going through the data submitted indicates that the Commission will have to 
deal with interpretations of the provisions of article 76 made by coastal States in their 
submissions. This function includes:  
[a]n assessment of the question whether the information that has been submitted to the 
Commission proves that the conditions set out in article 76 are actually met by the coastal 
State for the specific outer limit lines it proposes. At times, this may involve a choice between 
different interpretations of specific provisions of article 76. The Commission will have to 
make its own assessment of whether the interpretation a coastal State (implicitly) adopted in 
its submission actually is in accordance with article 76.”
 45
 
One submission may use one methodology and another submission may use another 
methodology. The function of the Commission is not to say whether one interpretation, or 
one methodology used,
46
 prevails over another. The role of the Commission is to assess the 
data submitted, that is to say, verify that the methodology used, by the submitting State, to 
delineate the limits of the shelf is in accordance with the provisions of article 76: 
[t]he competence of the CLCS is not to be interpreted restrictively as far as the evaluation of 
scientific and technical data submitted by the coastal State is concerned. The Commission has 
the function to make an independent assessment of the scientific and technical data submitted 
by a coastal State. This implies a power to establish whether the scientific and technical data 
                                                 
44
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submitted by a coastal State prove that the conditions which allow the specific delineation of 
the outer limit of the continental shelf are met.
47
 
Yet, it seems that the Commission interprets legal provisions only to assess the scientific and 
technical data. To verify that the methodology used is in accordance with article 76 implies 
that the CLCS analyses article 76. Analysis cannot be done without interpretation. The CLCS 
has consequently to interpret to carry out its functions. Therefore, it is supported that the 
capacity of interpretation of the CLCS is limited to the exercise of its technical functions, and 
should only be recognized for these purposes. 
These interpretations are made for the sole purpose of enabling the functioning of the CLCS; 
which means that its interpretations should allow the Commission to assess whether the data 
submitted are consistent with the object and purpose of the provisions. These interpretations 
are therefore made to judge whether submissions of the coastal States are valid in relation to 
Article 76 and its related provisions. Yet, the interpretative function of the CLCS is only 
recognised in the realm of the assessment of its technical functions. The interpretative 
capacities of the Commission are then limited. 
To give to the Commission the power to interpret all provisions of the Convention would not 
make sense. The CLCS is not a legal but a technical body; its power of interpretation is 
justified for the performance of its technical functions. These technical functions are set forth 
and regulated by Article 76.
48
 Therefore, the power of interpretation of the CLCS is enshrined 
in the frame of article 76, and does not extend to other provisions of the Convention. 
Not being subordinated to another body and having normative competence, the capacity to 
interpret of the Commission could represent a threat for coastal States and their sovereignty. 
Indeed, it is up to coastal States to draw their boundaries. The power of the Commission in 
the process of delineation could threaten the flexibility of choice of coastal States.  But a 
                                                 
47
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point must be raised, the capacity of interpretation of the Commission does not hold the 
competence of States Parties in that matter.
49
  
The Commission may face situations that surpass its competence. Indeed, if the request has, 
in whole or in part, a legal content exceeding the capacities of interpretation of the 
Commission,
50
 the latter will have to rely on a competent authority that has the competence to 
interpret.
51
 
The interpretative attribute of the CLCS is restricted. When submissions contain legal 
questions the Commission cannot interpret the procedure that should be implemented in order 
to consider the data submitted and make recommendations is undermined. The CLCS cannot 
deal with the submission and carry out its technical functions. The Commission faces an 
impasse and is deadlocked.
52
 Consequently, the Commission must bring the legal issue to a 
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competent body which, once the answer is given, will allow the Commission to resume its 
functions.
53
  
2.2 Extent of the interpretative attribute of the CLCS 
The competence of the Commission is framed by the functions that have been assigned to it. 
That is to say, the Commission is competent to interpret certain provisions of UNCLOS to the 
extent that these interpretations help finding the outer limits of the continental shelf: 
[t]he Commission is charged with considering submissions in accordance with article 76 of 
the Convention. This function includes the question whether the information that has been 
submitted to the Commission proves that the conditions set out in article 76 are actually met 
by the coastal State for the specific outer limit lines it proposes. At times, this may require the 
interpretation of specific provisions of article 76. The Commission will have to make its own 
assessment of whether the interpretation a coastal State has (implicitly) adopted in its 
submission actually is in accordance with article 76. At the same time, the requirement to 
consider submissions and make recommendations in accordance with article 76 indicates a 
limit on the scope for independent action by the Commission (emphasis added).
54
 
The Commission seems to be entrusted with the function to interpret in order to make it 
possible to carry out the functions that have been explicitly assigned to it.
55
 Yet, the 
capacities of the Commission to interpret are limited. The realm of its action is the framework 
in which it carries out its technical functions.  
2.2.1 Restrictive mandate of the CLCS 
The Commission needs to interpret to carry out its technical functions. The fulfilment of its 
technical functions seems so intertwined with the understanding of the legal provisions that it 
seems to the author that the CLCS has an interpretative attributive function. The latter would 
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be entrusted with the role to validate the outer limit lines of coastal States and with the 
function to interpret legal provisions. However, it is not clear whether the CLCS has the 
capacity to interpret article 76 or article 76 and other provisions.  
2.2.1.1 Limited mandate of the CLCS 
In a proposal to seek advice from the Legal Counsel of the United Nations, the following 
question was posed:
56
 
[w]hat mechanisms are available to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to 
seek advice on matters of interpretation of provisions of the Convention other than those 
contained in article 76 and annex II as well as in the Statement of Understanding adopted 29 
August 1980 by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea? 
Although the question was never brought to the Legal Counsel, some States Parties argued 
that “the Commission, in accordance with its mandate, should focus on matters of a scientific 
and technical nature and should refrain from looking into, or seeking advice on, legal matters 
of interpretation of provisions of the Convention other than those contained in article 76 and 
annex II”.57 It can be noted that the capacity to interpret is recognised through the expression 
“should refrain from looking into legal matters of interpretation of provisions of the 
Convention (emphasis added)”.  
Therefore, it seems that the Commission has competence in relation to article 76 and Annex 
II to UNCLOS. This view has been supported by the Chairperson of the Commission, in 
response to a statement on the competence of the CLCS, in which he said that “the 
Commission had the competence to interpret article 76 and annex II of the Convention for the 
fulfilment of its mandate but did not have the competence to interpret other provisions of the 
Convention that were not relevant to its mandate.”58  
The note contained in the Progress of work of the Commission does not mention the 
Statement of Understanding Concerning a Specific Method to Be Used in Establishing the 
Outer Edge of the Continental Margin, Annex II of the Final Act of the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea. The question whether the CLCS can interpret it is raised. 
The Report of the Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties says that: 
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[t]he Commission [has the] ability to determine the scope of its deliberations in accordance 
with article 76 of, and Annex II to, the Convention and the Statement of Understanding 
(emphasis added).
59
 
The Statement of Understanding concerns a specific method of delineation and has, 
consequently, to be applied by the Commission. If the Commission applies the criteria of the 
Statement of Understanding, the CLCS will have to deal with its interpretation. The 
interpretative attribute of the Commission must be borne by the CLCS in relation to the 
application of article 76 but also in relation to its related provisions: Annex II of UNCLOS 
and the Statement of Understanding. 
In addition, the Commission faces legal issues that question the scope of its interpretative 
capacities. China brought a proposal for the inclusion of a supplementary item to the 
nineteenth Meeting of States Parties,
60
 where it proposed ‘in accordance with rule 7 of the 
rules of procedure [of the Meeting of States Parties], the inclusion in the agenda of a 
supplementary item entitled “International Seabed Area as the common heritage of mankind 
and article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’.61 This proposal 
aimed to deal with the mandate of the Commission and its possibility to interpret provisions 
of the Convention and more specifically article 121 of the Convention. 
In the twenty-third session of the CLCS, the Chairman of the Commission on the progress of 
work of the Commission acknowledged that, “[the Commission] has no role on matters 
relating to the legal interpretation of article 121 of the Convention”.62 The Commission does 
not have the power to interpret other provisions of the Convention beyond article 76 and its 
related provisions. 
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The issue whether an island generates an EEZ, a continental shelf, and if the test of 
appurtenance is demonstrated,
63
 an extended continental shelf, affects the work of the 
Commission. The technical assessment of the outer limit lines depends on whether or not the 
island generates an (extended) continental shelf.  
The Commission has no capacity to interpret such provisions because it is not the 
responsibility of the CLCS to say whether a rock can sustain human habitation or economic 
life.
64
 The status of the island is related to the work of the Commission but its status does not 
directly affect the Commission. It affects the coastal States, which will be able to submit data 
to the CLCS. The Commission has only to deal with the consequences of such decision. If the 
island can sustain human habitation or economic life, the island can generate a continental 
shelf; and if the continental shelf goes beyond 200 nautical miles, the Commission will then 
be competent to validate the outer limit lines delineated by the coastal States.  
The Commission cannot deal with this issue because giving an answer to the status of an 
island overrides the scope of its capacities. It does not have the mandate to say whether 
coastal States have a continental shelf. Its role is to say whether the continental shelf passes 
the test of appurtenance (that is to say whether the shelf goes beyond 200 nautical miles) and 
watch for exaggerated claims.  
The Commission does not have mandate to deal with legal issues.
65
 The Commission has the 
mandate to deal with scientific and technical issues in relation to the application of article 76; 
and in that context the CLCS is recognised as having the capacity to interpret article 76 and 
its related provisions because the interpretation of these provisions is intertwined with its 
assessment of the data submitted and the making of recommendations. It is the role of legal 
or judicial organs to determine whether an island can generate a continental shelf. 
In conclusion, the Commission has a role to validate submissions of coastal States,
66
 a 
procedural role of legitimisation,
67
 and seems to be recognised as having an interpretative 
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function in order to assess its technical role. Yet, interpretation is not one of the roles of the 
Commission. It is a function knotted to its mandate. 
2.2.1.2 Mandate of States Parties 
In the Report of the Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties it is mentioned that the States 
Parties expressed the view that: 
[t]he Meeting should not confine itself to discussing budgetary and administrative matters. In 
that connection, several delegations observed that interpreting the Convention was one of the 
prerogatives of the Meeting of States Parties. It was also recalled that the Meeting had already 
adopted decisions that amounted to an interpretation of the Convention.
68
 
Other delegations were of the view that: 
[t]he mandate of the Meeting of States Parties was to deal with administrative and budgetary 
issues. These delegations emphasized that the Meeting should not engage in the interpretation 
of the Convention. It was also observed that the Convention contained appropriate 
mechanisms that could be resorted to for the interpretation of its provisions. A view was 
expressed that it would be inappropriate for the Meeting of States Parties to advise on the 
work of the Commission, which was an independent body.
69
 
Matters of interpretation seem to be the mandate of the States Parties in the view of some 
delegations. However, some delegations argue that the Meeting of States Parties (or Meeting) 
does not have such a function because it would impinge on the functions of the Commission.  
Overall, it seems that the Meeting has the power to provide guidance. In fact, in the same 
Report, it is said that the Commission, when it faces legal issues for which it does not have 
the capacity to interpret,
70
 “might provide the Meeting with a list of legal issues on which it 
required guidance.”71 The Report points out that the Meeting “had the exclusive power to 
provide such guidance and to decide in which cases the Commission might seek a legal 
opinion from the Legal Counsel of the United Nations”.72 Therefore, the Meeting seems to be 
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competent to interpret the Convention, and seems to be the organ towards which the 
Commission should refer to when it faces a legal issue that its interpretative attribute does not 
permit to elucidate.  
The twentieth Report reiterates that the Meeting of States Parties would be a competent organ 
to deal with interpretations of the Convention and, “several delegations reiterated that the 
Meeting of States Parties was the forum for the exchange of views and discussions on matters 
of a general nature relating to the Convention.”73 It is explained that “such exchange [would 
facilitate] the implementation of the Convention and [would lead] to further development of 
the law of the sea.”74  
Therefore, in relation to interpretation of the Convention, it seems that the States Parties 
would discuss and exchange views on the Convention.
75
 The use of such expressions depicts 
the scope of competence of the States Parties. They would not interpret the provisions of the 
Convention but would rather consider the current issues in a political surrounding.
76
 
Therefore, matter of interpretation should be forwarded to a competent legal body, the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (the Tribunal, or ITLOS), by the States Parties.  
2.2.2 Restrictive scope of interpretation of the CLCS 
The CLCS performs interpretative functions in order to assess the submitted data and make 
recommendations. The Commission has to use the rules of legal interpretation as the terms 
the CLCS should interpret are plunged into a legal context.
77
 The Commission should take 
into account the object and purpose of the Convention and the will of States Parties in its 
interpretation of article 76 and its related provisions. Consequently, the Commission will use 
methods of interpretation that are usually employed by States Parties to the Treaty. To 
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interpret, the CLCS should use the existing rules of interpretation and refer to the “canons of 
treaty interpretation”.78  
2.2.2.1 The intention of the States Parties 
The data must correspond to the rules and formulae of Article 76. The Commission must 
judge the value of the data in relation to the provisions of Article 76. This judgment must be 
made in accordance with the existing methods of interpretation.  
There are mainly three schools of thought in treaty interpretation law, namely, the 
“intentions” approach which is characterized as subjective, the “textual” approach 
characterized as objective, and the so-called “teleological” or “object and purpose” 
approach.
79
 
Interpretation of a treaty can be based on the “plain and natural meaning” of the words and 
phrases.
80
 This textual approach can be said to be objective.
81
 In the process of interpretation 
it is only referred to the words of the provisions, not to its context.  
Grammatical interpretation however should not result in an absurdity or in marked 
inconsistency.
82
 The intention of the parties should be at the heart of the process of 
interpretation of a treaty. It is the intention of the parties at the time of the drafting of the text 
and the particular meaning attached by the parties to the words and phrases at the time of the 
drafting of the treaty that should prevail.
83
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It should not be forgotten that the goal of a treaty is to write down agreements between States 
on a certain issue,
84
 and thus to define the relations between two or more States in relation to 
a certain point. A treaty is based on willingness of international legal entities, States, to enter 
into an agreement. The entry into force of this treaty marks the will of States to be bound by 
the provisions set up in this agreement.  
Therefore it is in the interest of the Commission to establish an interpretation that will favour 
States Parties’ actions and relations. Thus interpretation of treaties should not result in 
inconsistency or absurdity, because these could cause the failure of the purpose and 
application of the treaty.  
The grammatical interpretation more than meaning that the interpretation of a treaty should 
be the exegesis of the words of the provisions,
85
 should mean that the text should be 
interpreted in the context of the intention of the parties at the moment the text has been 
drafted. According to Sinclair, each approach is not exclusive of the others:
86
 
[t]he most rigid adherent of the textual approach would scarcely argue that a tribunal should 
deliberately seek to establish a meaning which was not within the contemplation, or intention, 
of any of the parties to the dispute; and the most rigid adherent of the intentions approach 
would not seek to deny that the text of the treaty will constitute evidence of what was the 
intent of the parties.
87
 
Thus, the CLCS, in the process of interpretation, should not prefer an approach over another. 
The Commission should, in analogy to a tribunal, interpret the provisions in order to give 
effect to the intention of the States Parties: 
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[t]he main task of any tribunal called upon to construe or apply or interpret a treaty is to give 
effect to the expressed intention of the parties, that is ’their intention as expressed in the words 
used by them in the light of the surrounding circumstances’.88  
The Vienna Convention, article 31 paragraph 1 states that “a treaty is to be interpreted in 
good faith ‘in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given’ to its terms in their context 
and in the light of its object and purpose (emphasis added).” This interpretation is usually 
used when the sense of a word or phrase is doubtful.
89
 
This “object and purpose” interpretation90 should be understood to mean that the treaty 
should be interpreted in the context of its creation and the ambition embedded in it. Under 
this approach, the provisions should be interpreted in a way to ensure that the word or 
expression that is the subject of interpretation will allow the parties to the treaty to achieve 
the goal they intended to agree when they concluded the treaty.  
Besides, the interpretation in light of the object and purpose does not mean that the whole 
treaty needs necessarily to be examined to find the sense of the particular word. It rather 
means that the word will have to be examined in the context of its particular provision and in 
relation to the object and purpose at the time of the drafting.
91
  
Moreover, the process of interpretation of a treaty should give an interpretation in which the 
reasonable meaning of words and phrases is preferred, and in which a consistent meaning is 
given to different portions of the instrument.
92
 Besides, interpretation should be done in 
conformity with previous practice and international law.  
Interpretation should be done with reasonableness and consistency. It means that 
interpretation of words and expressions should not go beyond the intent of the parties. In 
other words, interpretation should be done in a context of objectivity. Thus, interpretation 
should be reasonable in the sense that the interpretation should not go beyond what States 
intended to bind themselves, “since it is to be assumed that states entering into a treaty are as 
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a rule unwilling to limit their sovereignty.”93 Starke adds that “ambiguous provisions should 
be given a meaning which is the least restrictive upon a party’s sovereignty, or which casts 
the least onerous obligations.”94  
Thus, the Commission, in the process of interpretation, should render the Convention most 
effective and useful. In other words, interpretation of the provisions should favour the 
concrete application of article 76. The CLCS should enable through its interpretations a better 
application of the provisions of the Convention and thus permit the outer limits to be 
delineated.  
If the grammatical interpretation does not permit the understanding of the meaning of the 
terms, as is the case here,
95
 the Commission should defer to an interpretation based on the 
object and purpose of the provisions;
96
 so to speak, to the purpose and the context in which 
the agreement was written. 
2.2.2.2 Lack of authoritative competence 
The Commission takes the power to interpret to carry out its functions. In fact, it is a matter 
of proper exercise of its functions: compliance with the rules established by the Convention 
and, consequently, smooth functioning of the process of delineation of the continental shelf. 
It could be said that the CLCS has no competence per se to interpret, but has rather an 
interpretative attribute attached to the fulfillment of its technical functions.  
The interpretations done by the CLCS are recognised by some coastal States because they 
facilitate the work of the Commission and help harmonising submissions of coastal States; 
but the interpretations are not authoritative.
97
 The Commission is not a legitimate 
interpretative body. The CLCS does not have the competence, it takes it. The nature of the 
organ may explain why the Commission has no authoritive power to interpret. The CLCS is 
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not a legal body; it is not composed of jurists. The composition of the Commission represents 
an obstacle to the possibility for the CLCS to carry out this function with legitimacy.  
The CLCS is a technical body and the Commission can interpret article 76 and its related 
provisions for the sole purpose of carrying out its technical functions. The role of 
interpretation of the Commission is justified but is not yet supported by legal instruments or 
by every States Party.
98
 That is why the CLCS has at the moment only the capacity to 
interpret but does not have the competence. The Commission will have competence when all 
States Parties will recognise the interpretative function of the CLCS.  
The latter will have to be recognised to have the competence to interpret article 76 and its 
related provisions by States Parties. In fact, the increasing number of submissions and the 
questions the Commission has to handle are expanding and demand from the CLCS more 
work that what has been planned at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea. The delineation of the extended continental shelf is not only about application of 
formulae, it brings legal and political issues in the equation. The submissions contain more 
than scientific information. In brief, the mandate of the CLCS is amplifying inexorably. The 
Commission has to deal with issues that go beyond the scope of its original mandate. This 
will force recognition of the Commission’s interpretative competence. 
In the current context, UNCLOS or States Parties do not distinctly vest the Commission with 
an interpretative competence. The competence that has the Commission is recognised but is 
not currently legitimised by a legal instrument. Judge Wolfrum said that the CLCS provides 
“guidance” to the interpretation of Article 76.99 This means that the Commission, when it 
interprets, is simply adopting a “course of conduct”.100 When the Commission interprets 
article 76 and its related provisions, it does so only in order to give the modus operandi of the 
provisions. Its interpretations are not authoritative in the sense that they are not intended to 
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“dire le droit”.101 In the current context, the Commission is not recognised with the power to 
interpret the Convention; only the States Parties are recognised to have this competence.
102
  
Some international organs are vested with the competence and the authority to interpret legal 
documents. The Legal Counsel of the United Nations seemed to have the competence to give 
legal guidance to the CLCS through legal opinions.
103
 However, the practice of acquiring 
legal opinion seems to be disappearing; probably because of lack of legitimacy of the 
Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea. In fact, States Parties are the ones 
competent to interpret the treaty (UNCLOS) by virtue of their sovereignty. 
Consequently, the Commission is not currently recognised to have the competence to 
interpret because of lack of legal authority, and States Parties seem to appear as the 
competent powers to deal with the interpretation of article 76 and its related provisions. The 
Meeting of States Parties (the Meeting), gathering the States party to UNCLOS could be the 
competent authority to deal with interpretation of the Convention. Yet, the Meeting is 
basically diplomatic conferences. It is doubtful that such meetings help to ensure clear 
definitions of technical terms. Each State Party would like to defend its position and its 
interpretation of the said provisions. Thus the Meeting of States Parties may bring more 
ambiguities to the definition of the provisions than precision. 
As a conclusion, it seems that the appropriate body vested with the competent authority to 
deal with legal interpretation of the whole Convention would be a court or a tribunal.
104
 
ITLOS should be the judicial organ competent to deal with interpretation of the Convention, 
for ITLOS is specialised in law of the sea matters. 
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3 Possibility to seek an advisory 
opinion for the CLCS 
Under the provisions of UNCLOS, the CLCS cannot seek an advisory opinion from 
ITLOS.
105
 The CLCS is not recognised as an international body having the capacity to access 
the dispute settlement mechanisms of Part XV of UNCLOS (article 287). The Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf is not a legal body, is not composed of jurists and is 
not recognised the possibility to legally interact with the Tribunal or the International Seabed 
Authority. Each of these organisations works independently.  
The Commission was created to assess data submitted by coastal States to ensure that the 
outer limits of the continental shelf, delimitated by coastal States in a sovereign manner, 
would be delineated in accordance with the provisions of article 76. However, in order for the 
Commission to carry out its technical functions, the CLCS needs to interpret article 76 and its 
related provisions. Even though the drafters of the Convention did not intend to, the 
Commission has to take on a legal mandate to carry out its functions.  
Yet, the interpretative attribute of the Commission is limited to the extent required to carry 
out its technical functions. Where the Commission cannot interpret, the CLCS should be 
given the possibility to ask for legal interpretation to the Tribunal. The question whether the 
CLCS can take on the capacity to seek an advisory opinion is raised. It has been argued that 
the interpretative capacity of the Commission needs to be recognised because the CLCS 
needs to interpret to carry out its functions. Along the same line of reasoning, the capacity to 
seek advisory opinions for the Commission needs to be recognised, because the CLCS cannot 
carry out its functions when submissions contain a legal issue it cannot answer.  
This thesis encourages a liberal approach on the interpretation of UNCLOS and promotes the 
efficient work of the CLCS. It is in the interest of the Commission and in the interest of 
States Parties, potential submitting States to the Commission, to allow the latter to seek an 
advisory opinion. In the case where the Commission is stuck and cannot assess the data 
submitted because the submission contain legal issues the Commission cannot deal with, the 
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process of delimitation of the extended continental shelf is threatened. Parties to the disputes 
might use the judicial proceedings but they may also be interested in seeking an advisory 
opinion on the subject matter.  
Under certain conditions, the advisory procedure might allow to answer the legal questions 
faster and more efficiently. In fact, if the parties to the dispute agree to seek an advisory 
opinion, it might allow the parties to get an answer to the legal question and allow at the same 
time the Commission to resume its functions, consequently allowing the coastal States to 
delimitate its continental shelf. Therefore, States Parties to the Convention and the Tribunal 
should recognise the possibility to seek advisory opinions to the CLCS. This issue, like the 
issue concerning the interpretative capacity of the Commission, depends on the good will of 
States Parties and their ability to distance themselves from the concept of sovereignty.  
The Commission cannot entrust itself with the competence to seek advisory opinions; it 
should be entrusted with such competence by another body. Currently, the Meeting of States 
Parties does not seem to be willing to allow the CLCS to seek advisory opinions. The 
Meeting or States Parties as a whole do not recognise the interpretative function of the CLCS. 
Not all States Parties recognise the legal capacity of the Commission. If they do not recognise 
this function, they consequently do not recognise the possibility for the Commission to seek 
advisory opinions.  
States Parties want to keep their hands on the implementation of the Convention. The 
Meeting of States Parties (the Meeting) might allow the Commission to seek advisory 
opinions but only when the Meeting grants express permission. The solution would be that 
ITLOS grant access to the advisory procedure of the Tribunal directly to the CLCS on the 
basis of article 21 of the Statute. The Tribunal would have to include the Commission, as a 
competent organ to seek an advisory opinion, in the provisions of article 138 of the Rules of 
the Tribunal or in a separate article. Yet, States Parties might object. In fact, it would give 
legal capacity to a technical organ, would extend the scope of the mandate of the 
Commission, and affect the establishment of the outer limits line.  
On a long-term basis, the advisory procedure needs to be opened to the CLCS, directly. The 
Meeting of States Parties and the Tribunal should understand that the CLCS needs to be 
granted direct access to the advisory procedure in order to carry out its functions. The 
intermediate solution is, in the meanwhile, to open the extent of the existing provisions to 
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allow the authorised or legitimate organs to seek advisory opinions on questions concerning 
the interpretation of the Convention that affects the work of the Commission.  
3.1 Organs authorised to seek an avisory opinion 
The Seabed Disputes Chamber (or Chamber) exercises the advisory function of the ITLOS on 
matters related to activities within the scope of Part XI of the Convention. The International 
Seabed Authority is the international organisation competent to seek advisory opinions on 
these matters to the Chamber. 
3.1.1 International Seabed Authority 
The International Seabed Authority is an autonomous international organisation established 
under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 1994 Agreement 
relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea.
106
 The Authority is the organisation through which States Parties to the Convention 
shall, in accordance with the regime for the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (the Area) established in Part XI and the 
Agreement, organise and control activities in the Area, particularly with a view to 
administering the resources of the Area.
107
 
The Authority ”shall have international legal personality and such legal capacity as may be 
necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes”,108 which are, 
”in accordance with [Part XI], [to] organize and control activities in the Area, particularly 
with a view to administering the resources of the Area.”109 
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The Authority comprises
110
 the Assembly,
111
 consisting of all members of the Authority,
112
 
which is the supreme organ of the Authority and establishes general policies;
113
 the 
Council,
114
 consisting of 36 members of the Authority elected by the Assembly,
115
 which is 
the executive organ of the Authority;
116
 the Secretariat,
117
 consisting of such qualified 
scientific and technical and other personnel as may be required to fulfill the administrative 
functions of the Authority,
118
 which has an international character;
119
 and the Enterprise,
120
 
which is the organ of the Authority which ”shall carry out activities in the Area directly, [...] 
as well as the transporting, processing and marketing of minerals recovered from the 
Area”,121 and has legal capacity.122 
3.1.1.1 The procedure of advisory opinion offered to the ISA 
The Assembly or the Council of the ISA can request an advisory opinion from the Seabed 
Disputes Chamber of the ITLOS on legal questions arising within the scope of their 
activities.
123
 Article 191 of UNCLOS is to be read in conjunction with article 131 of the 
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Rules of the Tribunal.
124
 The latter states that the request for an advisory opinion “shall 
contain a precise statement of the question.”  
The Seabed Disputes Chamber has competence to respond to a request for an advisory 
opinion issued by the Assembly or the Council if the question is legal in substance,
125
 arises 
within the scope of activities of the Assembly or the Council;
126
 and if the request contains a 
precise statement.
127
 The Chamber will have to decide whether the question falls within the 
scope of activities of the body that seeks the advisory opinion.
128
  
The Chamber should take a liberal approach in order to include in the activities of the 
Assembly or the Council any question that would be raised by them. Where the rights of the 
States Parties are affected in the Area, the Chamber should allow the Assembly or the 
Council to seek an advisory opinion. The rights of the States Parties are not only affected by 
exploration or exploitation activities in the Area. Maritime boundary delimitation affects as 
well the Area and the activities in it. Legal questions in relation to the status of an island 
affect the delimitation of the territorial sea and the continental shelf,
129
 which in turn affects 
the establishment of national jurisdiction and thus the limit between the latter and the Area 
and consequently the activities therein.  
Moreover, it seems that States Parties should use the advisory procedure provided for in the 
Convention. If the Assembly or the Council, and through it States Parties, wish to ask for an 
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advisory opinion that would benefit the application or the interpretation of the Convention, 
the Tribunal should take this opportunity to interpret the provisions widely to put itself as the 
competent and authoritative body in matter of interpretation of the Convention. The Tribunal 
should open the advisory procedure before the Chamber on issues that affects, directly and 
indirectly, the Area and the activities therein. 
Article 159 paragraph 10 of UNCLOS states that the Seabed Disputes Chamber may also be 
competent
130
 to give an advisory opinion on the conformity with this Convention of a 
proposal before the Assembly on any matter. The proposal is introduced to the Chamber upon 
a request addressed to the President of the Assembly and sponsored by at least one fourth of 
the members of the Authority.
131
 The possibilities for seeking an advisory opinion under this 
provision are broad. The advisory opinion may be given on “any matter”. It would be 
assumed that the proposal should be in relation to the Area and its resources.
132
 However, the 
States Parties should take this opportunity to take a liberal approach and thus use this 
mechanism to seek advisory opinions on any matter related to the Area, and thus its extent. 
The fact that the proposal has to be sponsored by one fourth of the members, thus States 
Parties, may prevent the question from being sought. However, in the context of seeking an 
advisory opinion to get an interpretation of provisions of the Convention, it is unlikely that 
States Parties refuse or reject such a proposal. It is in the interest of States to get clarification 
on the application of the Convention.  
Besides, articles 159 and 191 of UNCLOS, and article 131 of the Rules of the Tribunal have 
to be read together with article 21 of the Statutes of the Tribunal. The latter states that the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction includes “all matters specifically provided for in any other agreement 
which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal (emphasis added)”.133 It provides that the Tribunal 
has a large competence and can thus deal with advisory opinions, not only disputes. This 
provision is to be seen as the founding principles of the liberal approach to be taken by the 
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Tribunal regarding its competence.
134
 It is from this article that the Tribunal should legitimise 
its broad competence in regards to its mandate and functions. The Tribunal should welcome 
advisory opinions for the sake of clarification of the Convention.  
Where the Convention did not provide for, the Tribunal should create law, interpret 
provisions in a broad sense or amend the provisions,
135
 in order to ensure effective 
application of the Convention. This could be called the functional requirements or functional 
needs of the Convention.
136
 Where legal changes need to be introduced out of necessity, the 
Tribunal should assume competence to deal with the matter and interpret the provisions of the 
Convention to provide practical solutions to the deadlocks encountered.  
3.1.1.2 The States Parties as a link between the CLCS and the 
advisory procedure 
The Assembly or the Council, as bodies of the Authority, can seek advisory opinions from 
the Seabed Disputes Chamber. Consequently, it is not States Parties who seek advisory 
opinions but an international organisation, the ISA. In this thesis, a mechanism is sought to 
allow the CLCS to get an interpretation of the Convention that it cannot elucidate itself in 
order for it to avoid a deadlock in the process of the assessment of technical data. 
If the Assembly or the Council seeks an advisory opinion, it is the Authority that gets an 
answer to a legal question, not the Commission. However, the competent body issues the 
question under the will of States Parties. In fact, the Assembly and the Council are the 
representatives of States Parties. The ISA is an intergovernmental organisation and as such 
represents States and acts under the directions of the latter. The policies undertaken by the 
Authority are directed by the will of States Parties. Consequently, even though the advisory 
opinion would be issued by the ITLOS to the Authority, the answer could be applicable by 
the Commission. In fact, the States Parties to the ISA are also probable submitting States to 
the CLCS. The coastal States could annex the advisory opinion to their submission to the 
CLCS. The coastal States could be the link between the CLCS and the advisory procedure. 
It seems difficult to admit the CLCS to have direct access to the response to the advisory 
opinion issued by the Chamber to the ISA. The two organs are not linked in terms of 
                                                 
134
 and its chambers. 
135
 by way of interpretation. 
136
 See P. Chandrasekhara Rao, “ITLOS: The First Six Years”, Max Planck UNYB 6 (2002), p.211. 
 
37 
procedure. The activities of the Commission and the Authority are linked in terms of 
jurisdiction. The extended continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines 
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured is situated in the Common heritage 
of mankind.
137
 In fact, coastal States should make payments and contributions to the 
Authority with respect to the exploitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical 
miles.
138
  Therefore, the delineation of the extended continental shelf impacts the Area and its 
management. Yet, the Authority and the Commission do not entertain links under the 
provisions of the Convention. The work of the two is independent. The Commission thus 
cannot use the response to the request for advisory opinion directly. The States Parties or 
submitting States are the link between the Commission and the response. 
The advisory opinion to be recognised as being of the competence of the Tribunal has to be in 
the frame of the activities of the Assembly or the Council. The activities of both these bodies 
are executive, they give orientations to the work of the Authority, in other words, they 
elaborate the policies of the Authority. The Common Heritage of Mankind
139
 is affected by 
the delimitation of extended continental shelves. In fact, “in carrying out [its] work, the 
Commission help[s] give practical meaning to the concept of the common heritage of 
mankind.”140 Policies of exploration and exploitation of mineral resources are dependent on 
the delineation of the outer limit lines of the continental shelves. At the twenty-second 
session of the meeting of States Parties, the Chairperson of the Commission expressed the 
view that “the work of the Commission was relevant to, and complemented, the work of the 
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Tribunal and the Authority, and vice versa.”141 Therefore, it seems that the Authority, through 
the Assembly or the Council, has competence to seek advisory opinions on legal questions in 
relation to the delimitation of the extended continental shelf.  
In conclusion, if the provisions of article 191 of UNCLOS and article 131 of the Rules of the 
Tribunal are interpreted in a wide sense by ITLOS, it will allow the ISA to seek advisory 
opinions on legal questions about the delineation of the extended continental shelf. The States 
Parties, under the umbrella of the competent bodies of the Authority, would be able to use the 
mechanism offered under article 191 of UNCLOS to seek an advisory opinion on a legal 
question relating to the delimitation of the shelf and thus use the answer of the Tribunal in 
their submission to the Commission. It may favour the interpretation of legal provisions of 
the Convention for the CLCS, and thus favour its technical assessment, if the States Parties, 
acting as coastal States,
142
 annex this advisory opinion to the information submitted to the 
Commission.  
3.1.2 International agreements 
Besides the Seabed Disputes Chamber, the Tribunal, as a full court, may also be competent to 
deal with advisory opinions issued under an international agreement that “specifically 
provides for the submission to the Tribunal of a request for such an opinion.”143 
 
3.1.2.1 Support  to the creation of advisory opinion for the full 
court 
It is not mentioned either in the Convention or in the Statutes that the Tribunal could be 
competent to respond to an advisory opinion as a full court. It is during the drafting of the 
Rules of the Tribunal, in 1996, that the Tribunal took the initiative to insert article 138 on the 
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possibility for the Tribunal to respond to an advisory opinion.
144
 The Tribunal created this 
mechanism under the umbrella of article 21 of the Statutes which gives competence to the 
Tribunal on “all disputes and all applications submitted to it (emphasis added)”.  
Some States Parties and intergovernmental organisations discussed the establishment of such 
a mechanism. The Director General of the Regional Fisheries Committee of the Gulf of 
Guinea addressed the issue regarding the advisory jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
145
as well as 
the Vice Prime Minister of Singapore who said that “[t]he ITLOS should be empowered to 
offer advisory opinions, like the [ICJ]”.146 States Parties147 also raised the issue whether 
“regional fisheries management organizations would be authorized to request an advisory 
opinion”.148 Some delegations, at the 16th session of the meeting of States Parties expressed a 
strong interest in such a procedure;
149
 and it seems that “there [was] thus a general movement 
in favour of the advisory jurisdiction of the Tribunal, an expression of support from States 
Parties to the Convention, which seem to consider it as a fallback procedure.”150 Therefore, it 
appears that the creation of article 138 of the Rules of the Tribunal, although not intended by 
the Convention, was created by the Tribunal with or under the will of States Parties.  
3.1.2.2 A procedure opened to international organisations 
Article 138, paragraph 10 of the Rules states that “[t]he Tribunal may give an advisory 
opinion on a legal question if an international agreement related to the purposes of the 
Convention specifically provides for the submission to the Tribunal of a request for such an 
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opinion.” Thus, comes the question whether an advisory opinion should only be made by 
organs of some organisations, and not by individual States.
151
 In fact, the provisions of article 
138 apply to “international agreement”, which means that international organisations would 
be the organs to seek an advisory opinion of the full court. 
Underlying the wording of article 138 appear the uncertainties relating to who may seek an 
advisory opinion from the Tribunal. In fact, the expression “international agreement” may 
refer to the founding treaty
152
 of an international organisation. In that case, the latter is likely 
to contain different bodies and charge one of them with the possibility to seek an advisory 
opinion to the Tribunal. If the international agreement is just a convention, there is no need to 
create an international organisation and entrust one of its bodies with the capacity to seek an 
advisory opinion to the full court. In that case, any international agreement that is related to 
the scope of the Convention and that gives possibility to seek an advisory opinion enters into 
the framework of article 138. Thus, any agreement, between international organisations, an 
international organisation and a State or States, or an international agreement between States, 
is a concern of the provision.  
The debate on who may seek an advisory opinion dates back to the establishment of advisory 
opinions to the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). The PCIJ could give an 
advisory opinion “upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or the Assembly 
[of the League of Nations].”153 In fact, the Council addressed advisory opinions to the Court 
on behalf of individual States.
154
 The Court has been criticized by some authors for taking a 
liberal approach,
155
 but “the fact remains that it was via this collective body that such requests 
found their way on to the docket of the Court.”156 
In the doctrine and jurisprudence of the ICJ, there have been debates on the possibility to 
open advisory opinions to States. In fact, opening such a procedure to States would impinge 
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on judicial settlement of disputes. If a State Party to UNCLOS, in a conflict with another 
State Party in regards to the delimitation of a maritime boundary, seeks an advisory opinion 
from the Tribunal on the matter, the latter would have to respond to one State and give its 
opinion on the dispute. The advisory opinion could be used by the State in case the dispute 
would be brought to judicial proceedings. The decision of the tribunal would be bound by the 
advisory opinion, although the latter is non-binding. The other State would object to the 
decision of the tribunal and the conflict would not be settled. Consequently, it seems difficult 
to open the advisory procedure to States. It is the reasoning given to explain why 
international organisations are the only ones recognised the possibility to seek advisory 
opinions from the Court.
157
  
The Tribunal, in writing its Rules, seem to have followed the approach of the PCIJ and the 
ICJ after it.
158
 Yet, the wording of article 138 contains a liberal approach.
159
 The ITLOS 
seems to open the way to a liberal interpretation of article 138 and thus broad competence in 
terms of possibility to seek advisory opinions. In fact, the Tribunal should be encouraged to 
open the doors of advisory procedure to other bodies.
160
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3.2 Organs that should be encouraged to seek an 
advisory opinion 
The advisory procedure is open for now only to international organisations under the 
provisions of article 138 of the Rules of the Tribunal. It may be conceived that the advisory 
procedure could open for States Parties.
161
  
The Tribunal is competent to interpret the Convention
162
 and should introduce legal changes 
out of necessity. Article 138 could be amended to open the advisory procedure to States 
Parties as individual States. The Tribunal, as an authoritative body is recognised to have the 
capacity to interpret the Convention, should take a liberal approach on the interpretation of 
the provisions of the Convention, the Statutes, and the Rules it created, to open the advisory 
procedure to any organ that has an interest in the interpretation of the Convention.
163
 Yet, the 
provisions of article 138 should in the meanwhile be used as they stand. States Parties should 
sign international agreements providing for an advisory jurisdiction clause giving competence 
to an organ
164
 to seek advisory opinions.  
As the Convention does not provide such possibility for treaty organs, such as the 
Commission, to seek advisory opinions in order to fulfil their mission, the competent bodies 
should create the necessary bridges between them to promote application of the Convention 
and peaceful settlement of disputes. 
3.2.1 The Meeting of States Parties 
The Meeting of States Parties may be seen as the competent organ to seek an advisory 
opinion on a question of interpretation of the Convention that could be used by the 
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 The advisory procedure could be opened to States in the future after the opening of resolutions of the issues 
on the affect that advisory opinions have on judicial procedure. Advisory opinions to States would have to be 
strictly framed. Thus the ITLOS should have a liberal approach on the interpretation of article 138 but a strict 
one on the scope of the request of States. See Section 3.2.2.2. 
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 Article 287 para. 1 (a) UNCLOS. 
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Commission. To that end, the Meeting needs to be recognised as having the legal status to 
seek advisory opinions. The Meeting has a President, and may be convened by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations.
165
 The functioning of the Meeting may allow thinking that the 
latter has the status of an international organisation, thus capable under the Rules of the 
Tribunal to seek an advisory opinion.  
The Meeting has a role to play in the introduction of changes and the creation of a bridge 
between the bodies, the Commission and the Tribunal, created under the Convention. The 
Meeting has to figure out its relationship with the Tribunal and with the Commission and the 
relation with the Tribunal and the Commission.  
3.2.1.1 Sovereign status  
The Tribunal could amend the provisions and include the Meeting of States Parties as a 
competent organ to seek advisory opinions. Yet, it seems that the most efficient way would 
be that the Meeting entrusts itself with this competence. The Meeting would have to consider 
itself as a competent organ to seek advisory opinions from ITLOS. The Tribunal would in a 
second step recognises the competence of the Meeting to seek advisory opinions from the 
Tribunal. A smoother way would be for the Meeting of States Parties to consider itself as an 
international organisation. That way, it could entrust itself with the capacity to seek advisory 
opinions.   
The Meeting could be seen as a permanent organ and thus an international organisation, since 
it created its Rules of Procedure;
166
 or as a “treaty organ”.167 The Meeting of States Parties 
could be an international agreement between the States party to the Convention. In fact, the 
Meeting of States Parties is mentioned in the Convention;
168
 the States who ratified the 
Convention were aware that they would meet under the auspices of the Meeting. Thus, it can 
be surmised that the States who ratified the Convention also entered into an international 
agreement creating “the Meeting of States Parties”.  
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 See Rules of Procedure of the Meeting of States Parties, Fifteenth meeting (16-24 June 2005), Meeting of 
States Parties (24 January 2005) (SPLOS/2/Rev.4) (hereafter SPLOS/2/Rev.4), Rule 3-5. 
166
 Ibid. 
167
 See Rao, footnote 136, p.211. 
168
 Article 319 para.2 (e). 
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If the Meeting is recognised as an international organisation, the Meeting should introduce a 
clause, in UNCLOS, its constitutive agreement, that would give competence to the Meeting 
or the President of the Meeting to seek advisory opinions from ITLOS on any legal question 
concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention.  
The Meeting could also decide that it is a competent organ, as a treaty organ dealing with the 
application and interpretation of the Convention, to seek advisory opinions from ITLOS, 
without regard to the provisions of article 138 of the Statutes of the Tribunal. If the States 
Parties to the Convention gather and agree on a proposal to seek an advisory opinion, there 
would not be any barrier to stop them. The States Parties are sovereign and are the ones who 
ratified the Convention. They are the legitimate body to decide of the application and future 
of the Convention. Consequently, the capacity of the Meeting to seek advisory opinions 
seems to arise from the need to seek advisory opinion.
169
  
3.2.1.2 Warrant to seek an advisory opinion 
When the Meeting needed to, it “made a change in respect of the date of commencement of 
the ten-year period”170, the Meeting also postponed the election of judges of the Tribunal 
“clearly deviating from the mandatory provisions of article 4, paragraph 3 of the Statute.”171 
The Meeting can be seen as having legal personality because it is a reunion of sovereign 
States who have legal personality. If the Meeting decides to grant itself the capacity to seek 
advisory opinions, it could presumably have legitimacy to do so. Subsequently, it should be 
agreed with Judge Rao that, “in the scheme of the Convention and the Statute, there is thus 
warrant for the Meeting of States Parties to seek advisory opinion of the Tribunal should the 
need arise (emphasis added).”172  
It seems to some delegations that “the Meeting of States Parties [has] the exclusive power to 
provide such guidance” on the uncertainties concerning the interpretation of the Convention 
on issues that might affect the rights and duties of coastal States”.173 The justification of the 
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 “it may be argued that even a ‘treaty organ’ like the Meeting of States Parties might, if it so decides, request 
advisory opinions of the Tribunal (emphasis added).” in Rao, footnote 136, p.211. 
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 See Rao, ibid., p.212. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. 
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 See SPLOS/203, footnote 59, paragraph 73. 
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Meeting of States Parties to seek advisory opinions has also been backed up during the 
twentieth meeting. The Report of the Secretary-General under article 319 of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea mentioned that: 
[d]ivergent views were expressed concerning the mandate of the Meeting of States Parties to 
discuss matters of a substantive nature relating to the implementation of the Convention. It 
was pointed out that the global forum with the mandate to undertake an annual substantive 
review and evaluation of the implementation of the Convention and other developments 
relating to ocean affairs and the law of the sea was the General Assembly and its facilitator, 
the Informal Consultative Process. While a number of delegations were of the view that the 
Meeting of States Parties should limit itself to the consideration of financial and 
administrative matters relating to the Tribunal, the Authority and the Commission, several 
delegations reiterated that the Meeting of States Parties was the forum for the exchange of 
views and discussions on matters of a general nature relating to the Convention. In their view, 
such exchange facilitated the implementation of the Convention and led to further 
development of the law of the sea. In support of that view, it was also noted that decisions of 
the Meeting of States Parties, such as those contained in document SPLOS/72, SPLOS/183 
and SPLOS/201, related to the implementation of the Convention.
174
 
The Meeting has been empowered in its Rules of Procedure with the ability to adopt a 
proposal submitted to it;
175
 in addition, the Secretariat should reproduce and distribute 
“documents, reports, resolutions and decisions of the Meeting”. The Meeting also has the 
capacity to “establish such subsidiary bodies as it deems necessary for the exercise of its 
functions.”176 Thus, the Meeting has the capacity to make decisions and resolutions and can 
create authoritative documents. It seems consequently that it has power to decide on 
substantive matters, not only on administrative ones.
177
 If the Meeting of States Parties has 
power on substantive matters, this power should cover all matters concerning the Convention. 
Power on substantive matters coupled with the sovereign powers of the members of the 
Meeting should be enough to allow the latter to decide of its competence and allow it to 
decide that it can seek advisory opinions.  
In the case of the PCIJ, the Covenant of the League of Nations did not provide for the 
authorisation for the Assembly or the Council of the latter to seek advisory opinions. The 
Council, however, “made requests for advisory opinions on behalf of other international 
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 See SPLOS/218, footnote 73, par. 112. 
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 See Rules 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Meeting of States Parties, SPLOS/2/Rev.4, footnote 165. 
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 See Rules 68, ibid. 
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 The Meeting has the capacity to make “decisions on matters of substance”, in Rules 53. See Rules 53, 54, 55, 
ibid. These arguments also corroborate that the Meeting may be seen as an international organisation. 
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agencies and States”.178 The Meeting of States Parties should be exhorted to create for itself 
the right to seek advisory opinions to the Tribunal. For instance, in the context of the whaling 
case brought to the ICJ,
179
 where there is a disagreement on the interpretation of the treaty 
between Australia, Japan and New Zealand, the possibility for the Meeting of States Parties 
to be able to seek an advisory opinion to ITLOS would may be prevent that States initiate a 
judicial procedure and enter into a conflict. It would provide with a better implementation of 
the treaty instruments.  
The tribunal, for its part, should clarify the scope of article 138 of its Rule and determine 
which bodies have the capacity to seek advisory opinions.
180
 As Judge Ndiaye said, “[t]he 
Tribunal needs several requests for advisory opinions in order to gradually set the pace with 
regard to the advisory function of the full Court.”181 He further stressed the point that 
“advisory proceedings before the Tribunal on legal questions concerning the application and 
interpretation of provisions of the Convention may prove to be a useful tool to States.”182 
Advisory opinions would be a good tool to get interpretation of provisions that are the cause 
of disputes between States. Opening the advisory procedure would be beneficial for an 
efficient application of the Convention. 
3.2.2 States Parties 
The Meeting of States Parties might be reluctant to deal with issues of substantive matters 
and consider its capacity to seek advisory opinions.
183
 The Meeting throughout its sessions 
raises issues concerning the application or interpretation of the Convention.
184
 Questions are 
raised but the issues are usually reported in following sessions, and answers, if any, are 
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evasive.
185
 The diplomatic nature of the Meeting of States Parties implies that where 
delegations do not agree, the Meeting avoids addressing the matter.  
Where the decision-making power of the Meeting is not desired to be used,
186
 States Parties 
in their individualities should seek for other options to establish a mechanism to seek 
advisory opinions.  
3.2.2.1 Use of the response  
It is likely that the Commission will not reject the proposal regarding advisory opinions as 
part of the submission. If the advisory opinion represents information relevant to the 
submission,
187
 it is in the interest of the Commission to consider it. The interpretation of a 
provision, or provisions, of the Convention by the ITLOS will allow the CLCS to get an 
interpretation, from a competent and authoritative body, the ITLOS, which could be used by 
the Commission in its technical assessment to consider the outer limits line delineated by the 
submitting State and make recommendations; consequently permitting avoidance of a 
deadlock in the process of making recommendations by the CLCS to coastal States.
188
 
The Meeting of States Parties should ensure, in the process of creating a bridge between itself 
and the Tribunal, that the CLCS could use the response to the advisory opinion in its 
technical assessment, either by allowing coastal States to submit the response to the advisory 
opinion in their submissions or by allowing the Commission to use such response directly. 
Such disposal should be included in the provision on the advisory procedure of the Meeting 
of States Parties.  
It would probably have more legitimacy if coastal States would include the response to the 
advisory opinion in their submissions. The question whether the CLCS has the capacity to 
use the response on its own initiative may be raised. The function of the CLCS is technical in 
nature, and its interpretative prerogative is restricted to article 76 and its related provisions. It 
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is thus questionable whether the Commission has the legal ability to know when an 
interpretation of the Convention is related to its functions. 
Such an approach would reduce the scope of action of the CLCS. In fact, the aim of opening 
the advisory procedure to the Meeting is to create access, through the creation of a bridge 
between the Meeting and the ITLOS, to interpretation of the Convention for the Commission. 
Thus, the use of the response to the advisory opinion should be as broad as possible. 
Consequently, the Commission should be allowed to use the response even though a coastal 
State did not, whether or not intentionally, included it in its submission. Thus, the provision 
that allows the Meeting to seek an advisory opinion should also mention that the response to 
an advisory opinion could be used directly by the Commission, to carry out its technical 
functions.  
In the case of an international agreement between States where they agree to seek an advisory 
opinion, it must be inserted in the agreement that the answer, whether it pleases the parties or 
not, can be used by the CLCS. Besides, when the CLCS is facing a deadlock, it should make 
a request to the Meeting, through the Statement of the Chairperson of the Commission to the 
Meeting of States Parties,
189
 to ask the Meeting to seek an advisory opinion on the question 
that blocks the assessing of the data submitted and the making of recommendations. 
When the advisory procedure is engaged either under the auspices of the ISA or under the 
provisions of an international agreement, the States, party to the Authority or to the 
agreement, constitute the link between the Commission and the response issued by the 
Tribunal, as a full court or by the Seabed Disputes Chamber.  
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 The CLCS asked to the fifty-fourth session of the General Assembly to include provisions ”to encourage 
States parties to the Convention that intend to establish the outer limits of their continental shelves beyond 200 
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It would be threatening for some States to allow this technical body to decide when and how 
to use the response given by the Tribunal. Yet, this should not be felt as a threat. The 
Commission should be granted access to responses because it needs legal interpretation to 
carry out its technical functions.
190
 The relation between the recommendations of the 
Commission and the decision (binding or not binding) of the Tribunal is the point that needs 
to be clarified.  
3.2.2.2 Window for individual States 
States Parties to the Convention may sign an international agreement on a matter related to 
the purposes of the Convention and provide that a body or a State party
191
 to this agreement 
may seek an advisory opinion from the Tribunal on a legal question related to the application 
or interpretation of the Convention.  
In the case of an international agreement between States, there would be no body to 
implement the agreement, the international agreement is not creating an international 
organisation, and thus the States Parties to the agreement would be the ones which would be 
granted the possibility to seek an advisory opinion.
192
 Yet, the States Parties would have to be 
taken as acting under the umbrella of the international agreement and not as individual 
States.
193
 
States Parties should sign international agreements on maritime boundary disputes,
194
 which 
should contain provisions on delineation of the extended continental shelf and submissions to 
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the CLCS. These agreements should integrate an advisory jurisdiction clause giving 
competence to the States, as parties to the international agreement, to seek advisory opinions 
from ITLOS. In that case, the international agreement would not be creating an international 
organisation, for there is no need to create one. The purpose of such an agreement is to settle 
the maritime boundary dispute. The international agreement is signed to permit the seeking of 
an advisory opinion to find legal answers to legal issues blocking the settlement of the 
maritime boundary. 
These agreements would have to raise the legal issues in regards to the settlement of the 
maritime boundaries and clearly frame the legal questions arising therefrom.
195
 The Tribunal 
would, in its response, “determine the principles and rules of international law applicable to a 
delimitation dispute”196 that would allow the States party to the international agreement to 
settle their maritime boundaries peacefully,
197
 on the basis of the advisory opinion.  
The settlement of maritime boundaries through, or with the help of, the advisory procedure, 
might be another way of settling boundaries, out of the judicial procedure, “and could be an 
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interesting option for those seeking a non-binding opinion on a legal question or an indication 
of how a particular dispute may be solved through direct negotiations.”198 
The most effective way to ensure that the Commission gets access to interpretation of legal 
provisions of the Convention in order to assess its technical function is to give the possibility 
to States to seek advisory opinions. Once the Commission holds off from making 
recommendations because the submission contains elements that the Commission is not 
mandated to assess, submitting States should be able to ask the Tribunal to give its opinion on 
the impasse faced by the Commission, so that the outer edge of the continental shelf can be 
established. However, the possibility for individual States to seek advisory opinions should 
not be discarded. Where neighbouring States cannot reach an agreement on their 
disagreement, States as individual States, should be able to access the advisory procedure. 
In order to restrict the procedure, the individual State should be allowed to seek an advisory 
opinion only when the agreement with the neighbouring State cannot be reached. 
Furthermore, the advisory opinion possibility should be open to the individual State after it 
has submitted its data and information to the Commission. The State should be allowed to 
seek an advisory opinion only when it is acting as a submitting State. The State would have to 
mention that the advisory opinion would be used only in the context of the procedure relating 
to the Commission and that the CLCS can use the answer, even though the coastal State does 
not insert it in its submission when the answer does not support its view. In addition, the 
question raised should be directly linked to the submission to the CLCS. The Tribunal would 
have the responsibility to make sure that it is. Once the response is given, the Commission 
would be able to make recommendations and the coastal State would be able to establish the 
outer edge of its continental margin if it wants to follow the non-binding opinion of ITLOS. 
The outer edge of continental shelves not being settled may be a source of international 
conflicts between neighbouring States on questions of sovereignty, exploitation and 
exploration. The delimitation of maritime boundaries is a sensitive issue and everything must 
be done to settle the matter as soon as possible. An advisory opinion may be the first solution 
to the settlement of the continental shelf boundaries. This solution should however be an 
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intermediate one. The long-term solution is to find a way to link the recommendations of the 
Commission to the dispute settlement mechanisms of the Convention. This thought-
provoking issue relates to the question of what happens to the recommendations of the 
Commission when the Tribunal must settle a dispute concerning a bilateral or multilateral 
delimitation of the continental shelf. In the opinion of the author, adjudicating the dispute is 
the task of the Tribunal and it might be within its prerogative to accept or reject the 
recommendations of the Commission after giving them due consideration. 
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4 Conclusion 
The first question, in the context of the relationship between the CLCS and the ITLOS, is 
whether the Commission can seek advisory opinions from the Tribunal to obtain an 
interpretation on a legal issue that arises in the course of carrying out its technical functions. 
It has been concluded that the Commission per se cannot currently seek an advisory opinion, 
and that it is States Parties to the Convention, through competent organs, that must seek an 
advisory opinion on a legal question that affects the Commission, to the ITLOS.  
The other question in relation to the relationship between the CLCS and ITLOS concerns 
binding settlement of disputes.
199
 In fact, the Tribunal and the Commission are both linked to 
the establishment of the outer limits line of the extended continental shelf. If the outer limits 
are established on the basis of the recommendations of the CLCS, whether ITLOS can then 
challenge the line if a dispute is brought to it on the matter is a question of crucial 
importance.  
The relationship between ITLOS and the Commission concerns, likewise, the technical/legal 
aspect of article 76 and its related provisions. On the one hand, the Commission should find 
natural prolongation beyond 200 nautical miles so that the coastal State is recognised to have 
the right to an extended continental shelf. On the other hand, the Tribunal is competent to say 
whether the coastal State has entitlement to the shelf.  
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The functions of both bodies are intertwined. If the Tribunal gives a binding decision 
(judicial procedure) on the delimitation of the extended continental shelf, before the 
Commission gives its recommendations on the outer limits line, the Tribunal risks 
impingement on the role and competence of the Commission. Yet, it may be that the Tribunal 
calls the members of the Commission for an expert opinion. In fact, both bodies can interact, 
even though they are independent in their work, because they have both been created under 
UNCLOS. If so, the work of both bodies would be coordinated and the risk of impingement 
diminished.  
The role of the CLCS is to consider whether the data submitted supports that the continental 
shelf is the natural prolongation of the coastal State and whether the State is entitled to an 
extended continental shelf (test of appurtenance). If the Tribunal rules on the establishment of 
the extended continental shelf, it recognises that the coastal State has a shelf. However, this 
work is technical and the evaluation of whether there is a natural prolongation and a 
continental margin going beyond 200 nautical miles falls within the mandate of the 
Commission. If the Tribunal recognises the existence of the shelf, it oversteps its duty and 
impinges on the role of the CLCS.   
If the Tribunal rules on the extended continental shelf after the CLCS has made its 
recommendation, the binding decision of the Tribunal might not recognise the outer limit line 
established by the coastal State. The present situation is likely to happen when the line 
established by the coastal State has not been delineated on the basis of the recommendations 
of the Commission. In that case, the recommendations of the Commission would not be on 
the same path as the decision of the Tribunal. The lines established would not be usable. The 
coastal State would in that case have to resubmit data to the Commission and the CLCS in its 
new recommendations would have to take into consideration the decision of the Tribunal. Yet 
the decision is binding only on the State which brought the matter to the Tribunal; 
furthermore, the Commission is an independent body and does not have to follow the 
precedents of courts or tribunals.  
If the line is established on the basis of the recommendations, the question may be raised 
whether the tribunal could find that the line established is not correct. In other words, the 
Commission, which has the mandate to make recommendations on the outer limits submitted 
and assess whether this limits are calculated in accordance with the provisions and thus 
calculation of article 76 and its related provisions, would be judged by the Tribunal as not 
having made recommendations in accordance with article 76. An affirmative answer would 
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put the Tribunal into the role of a watchdog of the CLCS. The Commission is independent 
and is not subject to any control of its assessment. It is not possible to think that the experts 
would not assess the data correctly. It is to be assumed that the only possibility is that the 
coastal State did not establish its line on the basis of the recommendations. 
In the case the Tribunal would not recognise the line established by the coastal State, the 
question arises as to whether the line is final and binding. The status of the line is at stake. 
The line established on the basis of the recommendations is final for it is deposited to the UN 
secretariat and binding towards the submitting coastal States. The line in that situation would 
not be binding to other States because the line is not recognised by the Tribunal and could 
then be challenged or objected to by other States.  
It may give rise to situations where the line used by the coastal State is not the same as the 
one recognised by other States; the coastal State may use the line established after the CLCS 
made its recommendations, the other States would recognise the line in the decision of the 
Tribunal. It seems that the line established by the Tribunal should be the one prevailing since 
an authoritative and competent adjudicative body issues it. Nevertheless, it should be kept in 
mind that the line could still be uncertain and both lines used. The coastal State should be 
encouraged to resubmit and the CLCS to take into consideration the decision of the Tribunal 
so that there is only one line, recognised by all. 
If the coastal State does not establish the line on the basis of the recommendations the 
question may be raised as to whether the CLCS can object to the lines and access the 
Tribunal for resolution of the matter. The CLCS is not recognised, under article 287 of 
UNCLOS, as an international body having the capacity to access the dispute settlement 
mechanism of Part XV of UNCLOS. The other States should access the Tribunal to challenge 
the line established incorrectly, that is to say, established not in accordance with the 
recommendations of the CLCS.  
Part XV gives a possibility to States Parties to opt out of certain provisions concerning the 
compulsory dispute settlement mechanisms. Although borders between opposite or adjacent 
coastal States is not subject to compulsory dispute settlement, the line between the Area and 
national jurisdiction is. The issue of delineation of the extended continental shelf can thus be 
brought to compulsory dispute settlement. The question is thus whether other States, i.e., 
third States, can access the Tribunal on behalf of the Area, that is to say, under the doctrine of 
common heritage of mankind.  
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Actio popularis is not yet recognised in international law. The ITLOS should take a liberal 
approach and take into account the functional needs approach to implement UNCLOS. In 
fact, the Area is the common heritage of mankind and represents the interest of the whole 
international community, as its resources belong to all. Third States should be entitled to 
access the Tribunal to challenge the extended continental shelf, where the latter has not been 
established on the basis of the provisions of article 76, breaching international law, because 
this breach impinges on the rights of other States to explore and exploit the resources of the 
deep seabed.  
If the Tribunal judges that actio popularis is too liberal, because too many States might bring 
disputes to the Tribunal on matters they disagree with and clog the Tribunal, the latter should 
support another option. The solution would be that the Tribunal should open the scope of Part 
XI to recourse on the extent of the Area; and gives the possibility for the ISA to access the 
Seabed Disputes Chamber for establishment of the extended continental shelf of a coastal 
State impinging on the Area.  
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Supplement A 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
Article 76 
Definition of the continental shelf 
8. Information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured shall be submitted by the 
coastal State to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set up under Annex II 
on the basis of equitable geographical representation. The Commission shall make 
recommendations to coastal States on matters related to the establishment of the outer limits 
of their continental shelf. The limits of the shelf established by a coastal State on the basis of 
these recommendations shall be final and binding. 
 
Annex II of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
Article 3 
1. The functions of the Commission shall be: 
(a) to consider the data and other material submitted by coastal States concerning the 
outer limits of the continental shelf in areas where those limits extend beyond 200 
nautical miles, and to make recommendations in accordance with article 76 and the 
Statement of Understanding adopted on 29 August 1980 by the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea; 
(b) to provide scientific and technical advice, if requested by the coastal State concerned 
during the preparation of the data referred to in subparagraph (a). 
2. The Commission may cooperate, to the extent considered necessary and useful, with the 
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO, the International 
Hydrographic Organization and other competent international organizations with a view 
to exchanging scientific and technical information which might be of assistance in 
discharging the Commission’s responsibilities. 
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Supplement B 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
Article 159 
Composition, procedure and voting 
10. Upon a written request addressed to the President and sponsored by at least one fourth of 
the members of the Authority for an advisory opinion on the conformity with this Convention 
of a proposal before the Assembly on any matter, the Assembly shall request the Seabed 
Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to give an advisory 
opinion thereon and shall defer voting on that proposal pending receipts of the advisory 
opinion by the Chamber. If the advisory opinion is not received before the final week of the 
session in which it is requested, the Assembly shall decide when it will meet to vote upon the 
deferred proposal. 
 
Article 191 
Advisory opinions 
The Seabed Disputes Chamber shall give advisory opinions at the request of the Assembly or 
the Council on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities. Such opinions shall 
be given as a matter of urgency. 
 
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
Article 21 
Jurisdiction 
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal comprises all disputes and all applications submitted to it in 
accordance with this Convention and all matters specifically provided for in any other 
agreement which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal. 
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Rules of the Tribunal 
Article 131 
1. A request for an advisory opinion on a legal question arising within the scope of the 
activities of the Assembly or the Council of the Authority shall contain a precise 
statement of the question. It shall be accompanied by all documents likely to throw light 
upon the question. 
2. The documents shall be transmitted to the Chamber at the same time as the request or as 
soon as possible thereafter in the number of copies required by the Registry. 
 
Article 138 
1. The Tribunal may give an advisory opinion on a legal question if an international 
agreement related to the purposes of the Convention specifically provides for the 
submission to the Tribunal of a request for such an opinion. 
2. A request for an advisory opinion shall be transmitted to the Tribunal by whatever body is 
authorized by or in accordance with the agreement to make the request to the Tribunal. 
3. The Tribunal shall apply mutatis mutandis articles 130 to 137. 
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